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Chapter 9
Aging and Exploitation: How Should the
Financial Service Industry Respond?
Marguerite DeLiema and Martha Deevy
Elder ﬁnancial victimization encompasses fraud targeting vulnerable older
adults and ﬁnancial exploitation by someone in a position of trust, yet it is
difﬁcult to deﬁne. This is partly due to the diverse mechanisms of ﬁnancial
victimization, the various actors involved, and the different types of relation-
ships between perpetrators and their targets (Jackson 2015). The National
Center on Elder Abuse (1998) deﬁnes elder ﬁnancial exploitation as the
illegal or improper use of an elder’s funds, property, or assets. An ‘elder’ is
typically deﬁned as an adult over the age of 60 or 65, although legal statutes
and social programs for the elderly may differ.
Financial victimization includes crimes such as scams and fraud, use of an
older person’s checks, credit, or debit cards without permission, wrongful
transfer of property or assets, misappropriation of funds, and abuse of
ﬁduciary duty by a trusted representative (Bonnie and Wallace 2003).
Friends, relatives, and caregivers who ﬁnancially exploit vulnerable people
take advantage of their trust to gain control of bank accounts, checkbooks,
and payment cards, often under the guise of ‘helping’ elders manage their
ﬁnances. The abuser may be an appointed power of attorney, a legal guard-
ian, a trustee, or someone else in a ﬁduciary role, or have informal access to
the elder’s money through a familial bond. Fraud perpetrators, by contrast,
are predatory strangers who earn their target’s trust by promising a future
beneﬁt or reward in exchange for money or personal information upfront.
Compared to younger persons, seniorsmay be disproportionately targeted
by fraud perpetrators based on assumptions that they are more trusting of
strangers, socially isolated, cognitively impaired, and have more ﬁnancial
resources to exploit. Older adults generally have higher credit scores, ﬁxed
Social Security or pension income, and more established savings, which also
makes themmore attractive targets for identity thieves and hackers (Comizio
et al. 2015). Although people of all ages can be victims of fraud regardless of
cognitive status or ﬁnancial sophistication, common scams targeting seniors
include bogus sweepstakes and prize promotions, unnecessary health care
products, imposter scams, bogus investments, tech support scams, and fake
charities (NationalCouncil onAging 2015). Toelicit compliance, perpetrators
use tactics such as false afﬁliation with a trusted authority, social consensus,
emotional arousal, enticement, intimidation, undue inﬂuence, and other
persuasion methods. Victims ultimately never receive the promised rewards
because they do not exist, were never intended to be provided, or were grossly
misrepresented (Titus et al. 1995). In this chapter we focus on ﬁnancial exploit-
ation, where an older person is taken advantage of by friends and/or family
members (people inpositions of trust), as well as elder fraud, where a vulnerable
older adult willingly agrees to give the perpetrator money in exchange for a
promised future beneﬁt or reward. Crimes in which the victim has no active
role in the fraudulent transaction or where there is no interaction with the
perpetrator (such as credit card theft or identity theft) are outside the scope of
this chapter.
In what follows, we describe what the ﬁnancial service industry is doing to
adjust to an aging client population frequently targeted by predatory scam
artists and greedy family members. We describe new approaches to ﬁnancial
victimization detection, prevention, and intervention by wealth advisory and
banking ﬁrms, and we also outline the current regulatory landscape under
which these ﬁrms are operating. We highlight the limitations of current
regulations and practices, identify regulatory/legislative solutions, and offer
options for improving protection.
Background and Signiﬁcance
As the number of adults age 65+ grows in the US, so too will the incidence
and cost of ﬁnancial victimization. A study by Holtfreter et al. (2014) found
that annual prevalence of elder ﬁnancial fraud was approximately 14 per-
cent among those age 60+ in Florida and Arizona. This is higher than the
rate of elder ﬁnancial exploitation by a family member of 5.2 percent among
community-residing adults age 60+ (Acierno et al. 2010). Both numbers may
be underestimates given the low rates of reporting among older people (Pak
and Shadel 2011). Estimates of direct losses from elder ﬁnancial victimiza-
tion range from $2.9 to $36.5 billion a year (MetLife Mature Market Institute
2009; True Link 2015), and total fraud losses for all US adults may be well
over $50 billion annually (Deevy and Beals 2013). In addition to direct
losses, other costs include legal fees and time off work to resolve the cases;
as well as emotional consequences such as shame, frustration, depression,
and feelings of betrayal (Button et al. 2010; Deem 2000; FINRA Foundation
2015). Among victims who experienced indirect losses from fraud, 45 per-
cent of survey respondents paid $100–$1,000 in additional costs associated
with the incident, and 29 percent paid over $1,000 in indirect costs (FINRA
Foundation 2015).
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The ﬁnancial industry has a pivotal role to play in reducing fraud and
ﬁnancial exploitation. Financial professionals are well-positioned to recog-
nize the hallmarks of fraud and ﬁnancial exploitation which include unchar-
acteristic withdrawals from checking, savings, or investment accounts; forged
signatures on checks or ﬁnancial documents; abrupt changes in powers of
attorney; unexplained asset transfers; large checks written out to cash; and
strangers becoming involved in the client’s ﬁnancial affairs (Conrad et al.
2011). A majority of ﬁnancial professionals have witnessed these and other
indicators during their careers. TheCertiﬁed Financial Planner (CFP) Board
of Standards found that 56 percent of CFPs stated they had clients who had
been subject to unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices, with an average loss of
$50,000 per victim (CFP Board of Standards 2012).
Financial sector ﬁrms face increasing pressure from regulators to ramp up
their ﬁnancial protection efforts. They can suffer customer litigation liability
and enforcement actions for failing to address the risk of fraud in their
compliance and employee training programs (Comizio et al. 2015). In the
2015 White House Conference on Aging, ﬁnancial service ﬁrms were called
on by the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to educate
employees and consumers on identifying crimes against the elderly (Cordray
2015). Due to the increased scrutiny around the issue, many ﬁrms are
investing in programs to better detect customer vulnerability before funds
are stolen and are developing protocols to respond quickly and effectively if
prevention attempts fail. These practices help secure client assets, restore
conﬁdence in the institution, and strengthen brand value (Gunther 2016).
Though these are powerful motivators, preventing ﬁnancial victimization
is fraught with risks. Regulations designed to uphold consumer rights to
privacy and autonomy sometimes interfere with a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial protection
efforts. For example, consumers have a right to make decisions about how
and where they spend and invest their money, even if these choices are not
in their best interests. So although ﬁrms have relationship management and
risk management reasons to intervene when fraud is suspected, they must
also be cautious not to infringe on their clients’ autonomy (Lichtenberg
2016; Lock 2016). This means they must attempt to differentiate when losses
are due to ﬁnancial victimization versus when they result from poor con-
sumer decision making in risky ﬁnancial markets. This is a signiﬁcant
challenge given the ambiguity of many situations.
Analyses
Our approach was to conduct semi-structured interviews with a range of
representatives from ﬁnancial service ﬁrms and regulatory agencies. We
agreed that data from written questionnaires would be less informative
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given the dearth of research that exists in this area to help design survey
items and the challenge of recruiting enough representatives who are
knowledgeable about the topic and their organizations’ activities. Our ﬁndings
were further informed by research from the AARP Public Policy Institute’s
BankSafe Initiative, policy briefs, ﬁnancial institution trade organizations,
and academic researchers. We focus exclusively on ﬁnancial advisors and
depository institutions because they have high customer contact and serve a
sizeable proportion of the older adult population.1
In selecting participants to interview, our goal was to survey ﬁrms that
varied in size and market share to identify the scope of detection, interven-
tion, and prevention practices. Accordingly, we spoke to two large banks
with over 70 million customers that manage $1.8 and $2.1 trillion in assets,
respectively, and employ an average of 244,000 full-time employees. We also
interviewed midsize regional banks with approximately $74 billion in assets
and 10,000 employees, as well as small community banks with fewer than
ﬁfteen branches, less than $1 billion in assets, and under 350 employees. To
report on the broker-dealer side of the industry, we also interviewed large
and medium-sized wealth management ﬁrms. The largest had approxi-
mately $2.5 trillion in assets and over 15,000 ﬁnancial advisors, and the
smallest had nearly $650 billion in assets and a few thousand contracted
ﬁnancial advisors. No small brokers or registered investment advisors were
interviewed for this chapter, a limitation that may be addressed in later
research. We also sought perspectives from regulatory bodies that oversee
ﬁnancial service industries including the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) (the largest broker-dealer self-regulatory organization),
the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).2
Questions posed to the ﬁnancial service ﬁrms included: (1) What is your
ﬁrm doing to detect and prevent fraud and ﬁnancial exploitation? (2) What
regulations govern your detection/prevention policies? (3) How do you
train your employees to recognize the signs of ﬁnancial victimization by
the clients’ friends, family, or strangers? (4) What are your policies for
reporting concerns that a client is being victimized? (5) Are there any
actions you wish you could take to intervene, but can’t because of regula-
tory/legal issues? (6) Is your ﬁrm going beyond regulatory requirements?
(7) Are there any other barriers to detection and intervention that you
would like to share? (8) Do you wish you could do more?
Questions posed to the state, federal, and local regulatory bodies/law
enforcement agencies were: (1) Under current rules and regulations, what
are [banks/ﬁnancial advisors] obligated to do to protect their clients from
fraud and ﬁnancial abuse? (2) Do these regulations conﬂict with what ﬁrms
are actually doing or not doing? If so, how? (3) What would you like to see
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ﬁrms doing better to protect their clients against ﬁnancial victimization?
(4) What do you see as the future of regulation in this area?
All participants were informed that no comments would be attributed to
particular informants unless special permission was requested. These steps
were taken to encourage the entities to speak candidly about sensitive topics
typically not discussed with researchers because of concerns about brand
reputation and potential liability issues.
Findings
A key priority across the ﬁnancial service sector was to reduce the incidence
of fraud and ﬁnancial exploitation. Our respondents expressed that the
interest in elder ﬁnancial abuse has grown exponentially of late, starting in
the broker-dealer side of the industry. Interest was driven by increasing
referrals to compliance departments and demand by frontline staff to
receive more guidance on how to address potential ﬁnancial victimization
of older clients.
We found signiﬁcant variations in approaches for resolving ﬁnancial
victimization that were based on differences between bank and ﬁnancial
advisory ﬁrms’ customer relationship models. Financial advisors have per-
sonal relationships with their clients and often work with the same individ-
uals for decades and through multiple life stages. Therefore they tend to be
more familiar with their clients’ ﬁnances, risk preferences, and short- and
long-term ﬁnancial goals. By contrast, bank employees have transaction-
based relationships with their customers. Their interactions are typically
very brief and they do not assist customers with ﬁnancial planning. Employees
of small community banks may know some customers personally, but large
national bank employees have thousands of customers who may visit multiple
branches across different locations. These different client relationshipmodels
have produced somewhat different strategies for detecting and preventing
ﬁnancial victimization.
Borrowing terms sometimes used to classify the stages of patient care, we
suggest that ﬁnancial victimization can be addressed using both primary and
secondary intervention. Primary interventions focus on stopping losses before
they occur, such as by training frontline staff to recognize red ﬂags, blocking
suspicious transactions, and educating customers about avoiding scams and
protecting their assets through estate planning. The primary interventions
that we discuss in this chapter include: (1) employee training, (2) commu-
nity outreach, (3) early ﬁnancial planning, (4) ﬁnancial tools, products, and
account features, and (5) data-driven fraud detection strategies. Secondary
interventions are those used to ‘treat’ the problem once it has already
occurred, such as recovery of lost funds and/or criminal prosecution of
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offenders. The secondary interventions that we discuss in this chapter
include: (1) federal reporting of elder ﬁnancial victimization, (2) reporting
to adult protective services (APS), and (3) working with local law enforce-
ment agencies. Systematic research on the effectiveness of speciﬁc primary
and secondary intervention practices is lacking in this area, so while various
programs are described in this chapter, their outcomes are not presented.
Evaluations of program effectiveness are sorely needed and should be
addressed in future research. Because intervention approaches differ
between banks and wealth advisors due to different client relationship
models and different regulations, their unique approaches are presented
separately in the following.
Primary Interventions
Training Financial Advisors
Training wealth advisors on issues related to elder ﬁnancial victimization is
required at all the ﬁrms we interviewed, although the focus, frequency,
duration, and modality of training programs differ. All businesses require
new employees to be trained to identify the signs of ﬁnancial exploitation
and the steps to take when exploitation or fraud is suspected. Some ﬁrms
require employees to complete training one time only, generally when they
are ﬁrst hired, whereas others require re-training each year or whenever
new guidelines and protocols are implemented.
While most ﬁrms state that their training programs are computer-
based, two wealth advisory ﬁrms indicated that instructor-led training is
more effective at increasing retention and conveying the complexity of
ﬁnancial exploitation scenarios. For example, Wells Fargo Advisors has a
training program that uses hypothetical video-based vignettes to guide
advisors and client associates through group discussions about elder
ﬁnancial abuse (Long 2014). This training is mandatory for all advisors.
Employees are also given instructions on how to OWN IT, which involves
ﬁve steps:
(1) Observe : Notice unusual patterns or changes in a client’s behavior. Are
there recent changes in the client’s health or mental status that may
explain the unusual behavior? Is a stranger accompanying the client
to meetings, coaching him over the phone, or overly interested in the
client’s ﬁnancial affairs?
(2) Wonder Why: Question these unusual behaviors. For example, why is
the client suddenly requesting a large disbursement of funds? Who is
the unknown third party that will receive the funds?
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(3) Negotiate : Try to convince the client to delay the transaction or to
withdraw a smaller amount until the request can be investigated by
the ﬁrm.
(4) Isolate : Speak with the client privately so that the suspected abuser
cannot inﬂuence the client’s responses.
(5) Tattle : Report concerns to a supervisor so that the situation can be
investigated further and a report made to APS and/or law enforce-
ment if necessary.
In addition to these programs, ﬁnancial service professionals are also
being educated about issues related to aging and how declines in cognitive
functioning may increase the risk of ﬁnancial exploitation (Marson 2016;
Little and Timmerman 2015). This has been identiﬁed as a key area of
interest among the ﬁrms we interviewed. Problems managing money are
one of the initial areas of cognition to be impaired with age, and wealth
advisors are sometimes the ﬁrst professionals to notice diminished capacity
in their clients (Marson and Sabatino 2012). Signs to look for include
repeated phone calls to the advisor, inability to recall signing paperwork,
forgetting prior conversations, losing track of important documents, trouble
understanding ﬁnancial concepts, and impaired ﬁnancial judgment such as
showing atypical interest in risky investment options (Triebel and Marson
2012). If diminished capacity is suspected, Little and Timmerman (2015)
recommend asking the client to bring a trusted family member to the next
meeting and to determine if the client has granted anyone ﬁnancial power
of attorney. They also recommend carefully documenting the conversation
and following up via a phone call or email.
Training Bank Employees
Most Americans do not have personal wealth advisors, but the vast majority
do have bank accounts (Survey of Consumer Finances 2013). Large deposi-
tory institutions and payment card retailers are at the forefront of fraud
detection using sophisticated algorithms that ﬂag suspicious transfers; how-
ever, signs of ﬁnancial abuse, such as unusual signatures on checks or
strangers who accompany an older customer to the bank, are not ﬂagged
by automated fraud detection systems. In such situations, customer-facing
employees are in the best position to notice exploitation and to get others
involved.
A recent AARP study found that 70 percent of adults age 50+ reported
that bank employees recognized them when they visited their local branch,
and 32 percent saw an employee they knew (Gunther 2016). A Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC 2014) survey found that over half of
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households age 65+ relied primarily on bank tellers to access their accounts,
compared to less than 20 percent of households younger than age 45 (FDIC
2014). As a result, in-person interactions with bank employees are still
common among older cohorts, and educating frontline staff may curb
rates of exploitation. One bank prevented $2.2 million in potential losses
through situational training where frontline employees learned the red
ﬂags of exploitation and how to report suspicious activity (Swett and
Millstein 2002).
Our respondents noted that developing ﬁnancial exploitation training
programs is costly, particularly for small banks with limited development
funds. To address such cost issues, ﬁnancial institution trade organizations
are helping their member ﬁrms create training materials and other media.
For example, with support from the Oregon Department of Human
Services, the Oregon Department of Justice, and AARP, the Oregon Bankers
Association developed a training manual and DVD for frontline staff.
The Oregon Bank Project toolkit and training manual outlines warning
signs such as sudden changes in beneﬁciaries or increases in debt, adding
third parties to personal accounts, multiple requests to wire money, and
unrecognizable handwriting on checks, deposit slips, or loan applications
(Oregon Bankers Association 2013). This toolkit advises staff on what to
look for when interacting with customers face-to-face. Such warning signs
include the following indicators: the customer is accompanied to the bank
by a ‘new best friend’; another person speaks on the customer’s behalf
without authorization; and the customer is confused and cannot give plaus-
ible explanations for unusually large withdrawals. This training manual also
features information on relevant laws and response protocols. It is freely
accessible online and has been distributed to banks throughout the country.
Oregon banks are now the second highest reporters of abuse to APS in the
state even though reporting is not mandatory for ﬁnancial institutions
(Gunther and Neill 2015).
Several innovative companies are using gamiﬁcation strategies to make
online training more interactive and to incent employees to participate.
Barclays, one of the UK’s largest banks, created an interactive web-based
training tool called Community Driving Licence. Employees can earn points by
taking short quizzes after each module and then post their points on the
company’s internal social media platform. The accredited program features
modules on how to recognize cognitive impairment and how to make the
banking experience more accessible to seniors (Gunther and Neill 2015).
Employees can even earn continuing education credits for enrolling in the
voluntary program. Such incentives have increased participation.
Acknowledging employees who successfully stop unauthorized transactions
also improves motivation and reinforces their training. First Financial Bank in
Texas instituted a Fraud Busters program to teach 1,200 frontline staff how to
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recognize and report signs of ﬁnancial exploitation. This program is based on
three principles: prevention, apprehension, and education. Employees who
successfully spot and report elder ﬁnancial exploitation receive public recog-
nition from the CEO and a Fraud Busters pin to wear to signify their com-
mitment to ﬁghting exploitation. So far, First Financial Bank has saved its
customers over $1 million by intercepting fraud and ﬁnancial exploitation
attempts (Gunther and Neill 2015).
Bank of American Fork, a small community bank in Utah, selects one full-
time employee at each of its retail locations to be the branch’s Age-Friendly
Champion. While all employees receive yearly mandatory training on elder
ﬁnancial exploitation, the Age-Friendly Champion attends quarterly work-
shops at the ﬁrm’s headquarters and receives leadership training on issues
pertaining to older adults. Dementia, sensory changes, and ﬁnancial victim-
ization are all part of the curriculum. These team members are encouraged
to share their knowledge with co-workers at the local branch and to foster a
culture that emphasizes reporting elder mistreatment to the appropriate
authorities (Gunther and Neill 2015). This program is perceived as success-
ful at cultivating heightened sensitivity to older customers’ needs, and it has
generated attention and praise from the media.
Some employee training is virtually free to implement. For example,
screen savers throughout the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpor-
ation (HSBC) display pictures of older adults alongside information on the
warning signs of ﬁnancial victimization. These messages raise awareness
and remind frontline staff to be vigilant. AARP is planning to create a
similar screen saver and distribute it to banks across the US. The screen
saver will be customizable so that companies can add their logos and other
branding.
Preventing Exploitation through Community Outreach
Education efforts have moved beyond frontline staff. Three ﬁrms reported
that they are hosting events to educate older customers and their family
caregivers about fraud. Outreach events are typically held at local senior and
community centers, churches, local businesses, libraries, police depart-
ments, and civic centers. Allianz Life has partnered with the Better Business
Bureau to create the Safeguarding Our Seniors volunteer program for employ-
ees and community members. Volunteers go to community and senior
centers to speak about exploitation and the importance of ﬁnancial plan-
ning. Collaborating with community groups brings credibility to ﬁrms,
builds relationships, and brings positive media attention (Barbic 2016).
Several community outreach and education initiatives are led by ﬁnancial
institution trade organizations. For instance, the American Bankers Association
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(ABA) Foundation launched the Safe Banking for Seniors campaign, with the
goal of helping ﬁrms improve fraud prevention and education programs
(Barbic 2016). Any bank can participate and download communication
resources such as ready-made presentations, handouts on ﬁnancial exploit-
ation, and ‘how-to’ guides for hosting educational events. The ABA Foun-
dation also encourages banks to network with local groups that serve the
needs of seniors, like Area Agencies on Aging (AoA) and APS. ABA also
recognizes banks leading the way in community outreach and age-friendly
practices through their Community Commitment Awards. So far, small and
medium-sized banks have received the most recognition. For example,
Bank of the West received an Honorable Mention for its partnership with
non-proﬁt organizations to host ﬁnancial exploitation seminars aimed at
low- and middle-income seniors and those who live in rural areas. They also
support broad consumer awareness initiatives by collaborating with aging
advocacy groups to create educational ﬁlms/projects and publicize infor-
mation about scams on social media. Other banks have also received recog-
nition from ABA for their toolkits designed to help seniors and caregivers
avoid ﬁnancial victimization.
Preventing Exploitation through Early
Financial Planning
To limit opportunities for fraud and ﬁnancial abuse, Lichtenberg (2016)
has recommended proactive estate planning between ﬁnancial service pro-
fessionals and their customers. Some ﬁrms reported using the educational
outreach materials developed by their companies as conversation starters to
encourage clients to think about whom they would appoint as authorized
representatives should they be unable to make ﬁnancial decisions independ-
ently. DaDalt and Coughlin (2016) present ﬁve ﬁnancial planning actions
that should be addressed sequentially by families and advisors to support an
older person. These include: (1) assess current assets, (2) review income
and insurance, (3) discuss future care preferences, (4) manage daily
expenses, and (5) plan care management.
Initiating delicate conversations about aging and cognitive decline has
been identiﬁed as a key challenge by the professionals interviewed. Older
clients may feel threatened when their advisors seek to discuss the risks
associated with cognitive impairment, particularly those who value auton-
omy in ﬁnancial decision making or who feel anxious about their cognitive
abilities. Advisors recommended that such conversations should occur
early in the client–advisor relationship, long before any signs of impairment
emerge.
162 Financial Decision Making and Retirement Security
As part of FINRA’s Know Your Customer rules (FINRA 2011), broker-
dealers (individuals that can buy and sell securities) are required to know
essential facts about their clients and who has authority to act on behalf of
the client. To comply, most ﬁrms require their advisors to have a conver-
sation with the client every three years (at a minimum). One interview
respondent stated that discussions about estate planning can be inte-
grated into these conversations, particularly when the client reaches a
particular age or life milestone. This respondent also recommended
that ﬁrms institute a ‘ﬁnancial checkup’ policy for clients once they
turn age 75 and 80. If instituted within Know Your Customer policies,
routine checkups may help normalize discussions around how and
when to transition ﬁnancial responsibilities to an adult child, a close
friend, or other relative.
All of the ﬁrms interviewed recognized that it can be more difﬁcult to
intervene when ﬁnancial abuse is committed by someone close to the client,
particularly when this individual already has control over the client’s assets.
Victims may deny exploitation to protect those they depend on for care and
emotional support, and they may not want the offender (often an adult
child) to be penalized by law enforcement (Enguidanos et al. 2014). Two
ﬁrms we interviewed recommended that, to prevent ﬁnancial abuse by
friends and family, advisors should encourage clients to name multiple
individuals to oversee their ﬁnances. Assigning co-trustees and joint powers
of attorney ensures that no single person has full decision making control
and reduces the risk of ﬁnancial abuse.
NASAA has also created power of attorney guidelines and best practices
with instructions on what ﬁnancial advisors should do if an appointed agent
takes advantage of a client. Additionally, the CFPB has issued instructions on
how to manage someone else’s money. These guides specify the rules and
responsibilities of powers of attorney, trustees, and legal guardians, and they
are publicly available for download.
As more people age without children or with children who live far away,
ﬁnancial advisors may ﬁnd themselves isolated when working with impaired
older clients who have no trusted people to help. One option is to recom-
mend that the client work with a corporate trustee from a bank trust
department or an independent trust company (Little and Timmerman
2015). Corporate trustees, though costly, are experts in trust administration
and tax considerations. Another option for ﬁnancial advisors is to contact
APS, particularly if the client is cognitively impaired and appears to be
neglecting personal needs. FINRA (2015a) has recommended that ﬁnancial
advisors not act as their clients’ power of attorney, trustee, representative
payee, or legal guardian, as this gives the advisors too much discretionary
control over client assets and may lead to abuse.
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Financial Tools, Products, and Account Features
that Prevent Financial Victimization
To prevent ﬁnancial victimization of older adults who depend on others for
care and support, some companies have introduced products that allow
caregivers to help elders with shopping, transportation, and paying bills,
while limiting how much total money can be spent. For example, True Link
is a debit card designed for families caring for seniors with mild cognitive
impairment. The primary caregiver—usually the elder’s son or daughter—
can set spending limits and restrict the card’s functionality to speciﬁc venues
and retailers, such as the elder’s favorite restaurant, a movie theater, or
store. The card is meant to preserve the older person’s autonomy by pro-
viding some ﬁnancial independence, but it prevents others, such as hired
personal caregivers, from misusing the funds. Prepaid debit cards can also
help caregivers purchase needed items, but this system can be exploited by
an individual who loads money onto the prepaid cards from the elder’s
account, so they should be used with caution.
Nearly every bank offers its customers the option to set up recurring
automatic transfers from their main accounts into joint accounts they hold
with others. Caregivers can use these joint accounts with lower balances to
pay for groceries, medications, utilities, and other services, but they cannot
access the rest of the elders’ money. Convenience accounts are safer than
traditional joint accounts and are recommended by the CFPB. These
accounts do not have the right of survivorship and caregivers can only use
them for the beneﬁt of the elder in accordance with the elder’s wishes
(CFPB 2016). Upon the death of the elder, the money is distributed accord-
ing to the will, rather than going to the secondary account holder by default.
Third-party account monitoring is another popular online banking service
whereby designated individuals have read-only privileges and may receive
fraud and/or spending alerts on behalf of the primary account holders, but
they cannot withdraw funds or transact business on the accounts. These are
simple and low-cost interventions which ﬁnancial institutions are promoting
to older customers and their caregivers.
Data-Driven Strategies to Detect Financial Exploitation
Spurred by advances in mobile and online payment technology (Heintjes
2014), retail banks have invested in sophisticated fraud management sys-
tems to identify suspicious transactions. Some systems rely on user-deﬁned
criteria to predict which transactions are fraudulent, whereas others use
advanced machine learning algorithms (Joyner 2011). Data gathered
might include customer demographic information, the amount of money
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transferred, the location and IP address of the device used, and the pattern-
ing of transactions. More advanced algorithms can now integrate unstruc-
tured qualitative data from consumers’ social media accounts like Twitter,
Yelp, and Facebook. The hope is that by modeling typical patterns of online
activity, ﬁnancial institutions can ﬂag deviations in behavior that signal
ﬁnancial victimization of customers of any age, not just older adults. To
stay ahead of scam artists, these fraud detection algorithms must continu-
ously evolve and incorporate new types of data.
If suspicious activity is detected in a customer’s account, the banks inter-
viewed seek to alert customers to potential fraud, usually via email, a letter,
or a phone call. Often customers will notice the unauthorized transaction
before the bank and will call customer service directly to report it. At Wells
Fargo and other large banks, complaints are forwarded to an internal claims
department for further investigation. The bank can stop the transaction if it
is still in progress and reimburse losses depending on the outcome of the
claims investigation. Wells Fargo instructs its customer service representa-
tives to use the interaction as an opportunity to educate customers about
how to protect themselves from future fraud attempts. Strategies recom-
mended include ensuring that all access devices are password protected,
and that customers inform the bank in advance about international travel
plans and changes in address.
When accounts are held at different companies, it is challenging for any
single institution to model patterns in customer ﬁnancial behaviors and
alert them to questionable transactions. One new company, EverSafe,
seeks to solve this problem by consolidating customer account information
across institutions and by providing daily fraud monitoring. EverSafe ana-
lyzes signs such as abnormal cash withdrawals, missing deposits, possible
identity theft, and unusual credit bureau activity. Some fraud alerts are
based on common signs of ﬁnancial exploitation, while others are tailored
to client ﬁnancial history and spending patterns. The company also helps
older clients select a trusted advocate who can help monitor accounts and
receive alerts if abnormal activity is detected.
Transaction history data can also be used to proactively protect clients from
fraud and ﬁnancial abuse. For example, based on the proﬁles of elders
exploited in the past, Barclays has applied speciﬁc search criteria to identify
others with similar risk factors.Oneof the parameters selectedwas whether the
customer issued an abnormally high number of checks in a very short period.
Once such high-risk customers are identiﬁed, the bank places notiﬁcations on
these accounts as an indication to frontline staff to educate these customers on
reducing fraud risk during subsequent phone calls or visits to a branch. The
ﬁrm is currently exploring amore direct approach, whereby bank staff contact
the customer proactively to discuss fraud rather than waiting for the customer
to initiate the conversation (Gunther and Neill 2015).
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Secondary Interventions
Federal Reporting of Elder Financial Victimization
In addition to detecting elder ﬁnancial exploitation, ﬁnancial service pro-
fessionals receive training in reporting procedures. All depository institu-
tions and securities ﬁrms must submit a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to
the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Fin-
CEN) within thirty days following an incident. SAR ﬁlings help law enforce-
ment agencies identify individuals, groups, and organizations involved in
committing fraud, money laundering, and other crimes. In February 2011, a
new category, ‘Elder Financial Exploitation’, was added to the reporting
form following advisory notice FIN-2011-A003. In the eighteen months
following the release of the new guidance, there was a 382 percent increase
in the number of reports containing the terms ‘elder ﬁnancial abuse’ and
‘elder ﬁnancial exploitation’ (FinCEN 2013). This increase is depicted in
Figure 9.1.
The reporting trend has continued to rise, particularly among banks. In
2015, depository institutions ﬁled over 19,000 elder ﬁnancial exploitation
SARs, compared to 10,923 in 2013. Figure 9.2 shows that only 568 elder
ﬁnancial exploitation SARs were ﬁled by securities ﬁrms in 2013, compared
to 1,763 in 2015, or an increase of over 210 percent in just two years.
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Figure 9.1. Increase in SAR ﬁlings containing the phrase ‘elder ﬁnancial exploit-
ation’ following FinCEN Advisory FIN-2011-A003 (August 2010–August 2011)
Notes: SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues. BSA Advisory Group. Issue 23. Available at
<https://www.ﬁncen.gov/news_room/rp/ﬁles/sar_tti_23.pdf>.
Source: FinCEN (2013).
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Financial exploitation by a relative or caregiver has been the most com-
mon type of elder ﬁnancial victimization reported by depository institutions,
which, compared to other types of ﬁnancial institutions, ﬁle the highest
number of ﬁnancial exploitation SARs. Misuse of funds by an appointed
power of attorney and the use of coercion to manipulate the client have also
been frequently cited. Among ﬁlers with securities and futures ﬁrms, the
most common type of activities reported were sweetheart scams, suspicious
identiﬁcation, embezzlement, identity theft, and mail fraud (FinCEN 2013).
The addition of elder ﬁnancial exploitation as a new SAR ﬁling category
has helped protect at-risk seniors (FinCEN 2013). Money service businesses
have identiﬁed and blocked the majority of suspicious transactions that were
ﬁled. FinCEN has also claimed that the reporting category increased aware-
ness across multiple sectors of the industry, evidenced by how many ﬁrms
incorporated elder ﬁnancial exploitation into their suspicious activity and
risk monitoring programs.
Despite some evidence that this new ﬁling category has boosted aware-
ness, one ﬁrm interviewed stated that SARs were ineffective at resolving
ﬁnancial exploitation at the individual level due to inaction by law enforce-
ment following a report. This ﬁrm stated that the lack of response created a
disincentive to ﬁle. Indeed, there has been little indication that regional
SAR Review Teams (comprised of representatives from state and federal law
enforcement agencies) have pursued elder ﬁnancial exploitation cases. One
reason is that such reports represent only a small proportion of total SAR
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ation’ from 2012 to 2015 by type of ﬁnancial service institution
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ﬁlings. Moreover, SARs are considered highly conﬁdential documents, and
some local law enforcement agencies must request access to the data from
their state coordinators, which may be the state attorney general, state
police, or the department of public safety (FinCEN 2012). This process
slows investigations and acts as a further disincentive for police to pursue
these challenging cases.
Reporting to Adult Protective Services
In addition to SARs ﬁlings, required by ﬁrms across all ﬁnancial service
sectors, elder ﬁnancial victimization reports to APS are mandatory for
ﬁnancial institutions in twenty-ﬁve states. In other states, such as Iowa and
Virginia, ﬁnancial institution employees are permitted to report abuse to
APS but it is not mandatory (Comizio et al. 2015). Laws vary with respect to
what ﬁnancial service designations are included—broker-dealers, account-
ants, insurers, banks, etc.—and who at a company must report—a director
or ofﬁcer of the institution or any afﬁliated employee. Table 9.1 describes
which states have mandatory reporting laws for ﬁnancial institutions and
who at the institution must ﬁle the report.
At the majority of ﬁrms interviewed, employees relay suspicions of ﬁnan-
cial exploitation or fraud to a supervisor or a manager. The supervisor can
then escalate the case to an internal compliance department that decides
whether to report to APS and/or law enforcement. Wells Fargo Advisors has
created the Elder Strategy Group, a central intake ofﬁce comprised of
lawyers and paralegals who specialize in elder ﬁnancial exploitation. This
team receives reports from advisors and client associates located anywhere
in the country, investigates the allegations internally, and will contact the
APS ofﬁce in the location where the client resides if the allegations need to
be investigated further and if the client needs protection. Out of 1,860
incoming reports between January through December 2015, 818 cases
were reported to APS or law enforcement. Approximately 32 percent of
these cases involved suspected abuse by family members, 23 percent
involved exploitation by third parties (caregivers, neighbors, and friends),
and 10 percent were scams by strangers (Long 2015). Although not all states
require elder abuse reporting by ﬁnancial institutions, Wells Fargo Advisors
considers itself a mandated reporter and will contact APS regardless of any
particular state’s requirements (Long 2016).
Many ﬁnancial institutions initially opposed mandatory reporting laws
because of liability concerns, fear of jeopardizing customer trust, and lack
of conﬁdence that their reports would be addressed promptly and effect-
ively by APS (Swett and Millstein 2002). Some interview respondents
argued that reporting could potentially increase client risk of harm by the
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perpetrator if they become aware of APS involvement; also, even if APS
could help, the agency might be too understaffed and overwhelmed by the
high volume of cases to quickly intervene. As a result, some of the ﬁrms we
interviewed preferred to resolve the less serious cases internally, such as by
helping to recover lost assets and getting other family members involved.
Nevertheless, they recognized the importance of involving social services
when clients were not safe.
Although many concerns were raised about the efﬁcacy of mandatory
reporting, it is clear that these laws have increased the total number of cases
investigated by APS. After mandatory reporting laws were revised to include
ﬁnancial institutions in California, reports from ﬁnancial institutions
jumped from 127 cases in 2006, to 940 cases in 2007, representing a 640
percent increase (Navarro et al. 2009). There is still debate about whether
TABLE . Mandatory reporting laws for ﬁnancial service institutions and employees
by state (2015)
States without
mandatory
reporting
States with
mandatory reporting
(any employee)
States with mandatory
reporting (ﬁnancial
institution)
States with
voluntary
reporting laws
Alabama Arizona District of Columbia Iowa
Alaska Arkansas Hawaii Missouri
Connecticut California Kansas Nevada
Idaho Colorado Maryland New Jersey
Illinois Delaware Washington Vermont
Maine Florida Virginia
Massachusetts Georgia
Michigan Indiana
Minnesota Kentucky
Montana Louisiana
Nebraska Mississippi
New York New Hampshire
North Dakota New Mexico
Ohio North Carolina
Oregon Oklahoma
Pennsylvania Rhode Island
South Dakota South Carolina
West Virginia Tennessee
Wisconsin Texas
Utah
Wyoming
Note: Financial institution must report when it refuses to disburse funds based on a reasonable
belief that ﬁnancial exploitation of a vulnerable adult may have occurred, may have been
attempted, or is being attempted.
Source: National Adult Protective Services Association Elder Financial Exploitation Advisory
Board and EverSafe (2015).
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mandated reporting is necessary to motivate ﬁnancial professionals to
report. According to one interview respondent, states such as Massachusetts
and Oregon have been successful at increasing reports to APS despite not
having laws that make it mandatory. To help address some of the current
limitations in elder abuse response and to increase visibility around the
issue, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA),
a trade organization for ﬁnancial advisors, has advocated increasing govern-
ment funding to APS (SIFMA 2016).
Working with Law Enforcement
When ﬁnancial exploitation has occurred, key priorities for ﬁnancial insti-
tutions and victim advocates are to protect the older person and to recover
assets. Other priorities are to ensure that perpetrators are apprehended and
that appropriate legal and criminal justice outcomes are pursued. These
solutions generally require law enforcement and APS involvement. We
interviewed a ﬁnancial crimes detective who shared a story about a local
branch manager who called police immediately when an elderly customer
requested an unusually large withdrawal and was shadowed by a stranger
during a visit to her bank. A deputy responded immediately and arrested the
suspect in the parking lot. The scam artist, who was also attempting to ﬂeece
other seniors in the area, could have continued with this scheme if law
enforcement had not been contacted right away.
Criminal prosecution of those who exploit vulnerable adults is only pos-
sible through cooperation and information sharing with law enforcement.
Contacting APS and law enforcement can prevent re-victimization and
ensure client assets are protected. The ﬁnancial crimes detective stated
that banks and ﬁnancial advisors must have contacts at local police or sheriff
stations to advise and facilitate investigations of fraud and ﬁnancial exploit-
ation. To comply with investigations, ﬁnancial ﬁrms can help law enforce-
ment by promptly releasing client ﬁnancial records and other supporting
evidence such as ATM camera and CCTV footage that may help identify the
perpetrator. The detective stated that, although banks have improved com-
munication with police in recent years, more collaboration and cross-
training is needed.
The Regulatory Puzzle
If clients are cognitively intact, ﬁnancial professionals are obligated to
execute their orders and protect their private information, even if they
believe the clients are making poor ﬁnancial decisions. Interfering with a
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transaction by placing a hold on the disbursement of funds or by disclosing
information to third parties may result in lawsuits from clients and/or
sanctions from regulatory agencies. Yet there is also pressure from these
regulators to protect clients from fraud and ﬁnancial abuse. The ﬁrms
interviewed stated that the contradictory pressures from regulators places
them in legal limbo, particularly when confronted with complex or ambigu-
ous ﬁnancial exploitation scenarios.
According to our interviews, ﬁrms wish to do more to protect older
clients, and regulators agreed that more actions are necessary, but the
complicated patchwork of state and federal oversight, shown in Figure 9.3,
makes it difﬁcult to have a consistent response to elder ﬁnancial exploit-
ation. For example, depending on their designations and certiﬁcations,
ﬁnancial planners are governed by different entities and different laws
(US Government Accountability Ofﬁce 2011). Registered investment advi-
sors are regulated either by their state securities departments and/or by the
SEC, depending on the size of their ﬁrms. FINRA, which is an independent
self-regulatory membership-based organization (SRO), is empowered by the
SEC to oversee broker-dealers. Although banks and ﬁnancial advisors have
similar rules governing customer privacy and reporting elder ﬁnancial
exploitation, banks are regulated by prudential regulators such as the
FDIC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board System, the
Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and also by the CFPB.
Privacy Concerns
The primary concern among interview respondents was violating regula-
tions intended to protect customer privacy. The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
(GLBA } 504(a) (1)) of 1999 requires ﬁnancial institutions to inform clients
about their privacy policies, describe the conditions under which they may
disclose non-public personally identiﬁable ﬁnancial information to third
parties, and provide a way for clients to opt out of information sharing
(US Government Publishing Ofﬁce 1999). Without client consent, ﬁnancial
institutions cannot contact next of kin if they suspect cognitive impairment
or exploitation. But a close inspection of the GLBA shows that there are
important exceptions to these privacy rules (Hughes 2003). First, notiﬁca-
tion and opt-out requirements do not apply in situations where ﬁrms act to
‘protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud, unauthorized transac-
tions, claims, or other liability’ (GLBA } 248.15(2) (ii)). Second, client
information can be shared with local law enforcement agencies and federal
regulators, and it can also be shared to comply with ‘a properly authorized
civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation, or subpoena or summons by
federal, state, or local authorities’ (GLBA } 248.15(7) (ii)). Accordingly,
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ﬁnancial institutions and their employees have immunity from civil liability
when reporting known or suspected ﬁnancial exploitation, even if the alle-
gations are ultimately not substantiated. This protection includes disclosing
information to comply with voluntary or mandatory reporting laws and to ﬁle
suspicious activity reports with FinCEN (Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the
Currency 2013).
Statutory and case laws also protect personalﬁnancial information, butmost
have exceptions for disclosing ﬁnancial records to APS and law enforcement.
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Investment
advisors
Exchanges,
payment and
clearing
systems
Consumer
lenders
Retail
banks
State
securities
regulators
State
banking
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Financial
Crimes
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Figure 9.3. Regulatory oversight of select ﬁnancial service providersb
Notes: a While the SEC is responsible for ensuring fairness for individual investors, FINRA is
responsible for overseeing US stockbrokers and brokerage ﬁrms. FINRA is a self-regulatory
organization (SRO), a non-governmental, membership-based organization that has the power to
create and enforce security regulations and standards. b There are also other types of ﬁnancial
service providers—e.g., investment banks, commercial lenders, insurance companies—that are
not depicted here. This ﬁgure excludes providers that do not offer direct services to consumers
and their associated oversight agencies because these organizations are outside the scope of the
chapter (FINRA 2011).
Source : Adapted from Murphy (2015: Table 2).
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Other than one state, SouthDakota, APS laws provide immunity from civil and
criminal liability to any person who reports elder ﬁnancial abuse as long as they
reported in good faith. One problem is that these laws do not specify whether
‘any person’ applies only to the individual employee or to the whole entity.
Additionally, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA) protects
conﬁdentiality of personal ﬁnancial records (US Government Publishing
Ofﬁce 1978b). Customers must be given prior notice and an opportunity to
challenge the federal government’s action in court before the government
can obtain their private ﬁnancial information from the ﬁrm. Nevertheless,
the RFPA applies only to the federal government and not to state and local
agencies like APS and police departments. These agencies can obtain cus-
tomer ﬁnancial records for investigative purposes. For example, if a bank
teller in California suspected that a family member was manipulating an
older client with dementia to withdrawal funds from his savings account, the
bank can report concerns to APS and share the client’s ﬁnancial records
with law enforcement when requested. None of these actions violate the
provisions of GLBA or RFPA.
Rule Changes and Safe Harbor Protections
Several wealth advisory ﬁrms have stated that universal standards and safe
harbor protections would enable them to do more to protect clients without
fear of lawsuits and enforcement actions. Wells Fargo Advisors is taking a
proactive approach, asking new clients to specify one or more ‘emergency
contacts’ when they ﬁrst open an account with the ﬁrm. The ‘ICE’ form (In
Case of Emergency) authorizes the representative to contact the designated
individual(s) if there are concerns about ﬁnancial exploitation or fraud. Some
emergency contact forms are modeled after advanced health care directives:
they provide ﬂexibility by allowing the client to specify what personal informa-
tion can be shared with a speciﬁed contact and under what conditions. Unlike
a power of attorney, the emergency contact form does not authorize the
named individual(s) to transact business on behalf of the client, only to receive
and share information related to the ﬁnancial advisor’s concerns.
Encouraging all new clients to name one or more emergency contacts will
likely become a standard practice in years to come, but the forms have not
been widely implemented and ﬁrms will be slow to collect this information
from their existing clients. Financial institutions are already grappling with
situations in which a vulnerable client has failed to provide authorization in
advance, and where the client has no trusted friends or family members to
name as emergency contacts. Financial advisors also fear that by delaying
potentially fraudulent transactions, they may face liability for failing to
follow through with the client’s orders.
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New legislation is being proposed to address these fears. In 2015, Missouri
became the ﬁrst state to pass landmark legislation, the Senior Savings
Protection Act (MO Senate Bill 244/House Bill 636), that allows broker-
dealers to breach privacy laws without being subject to civil liability suits as
long as they have reason to suspect a client is being ﬁnancially exploited.
A qualiﬁed individual at the ﬁrm (a supervisor or compliance ofﬁcer) is
permitted to notify the client’s legal representative or an immediate family
member, such as a spouse, child, or sibling. The Act also allows ﬁnancial
advisors to hold a questionable disbursement for up to ten business days
without penalty and report elder ﬁnancial exploitation to the Department
of Health and Senior Services and the Missouri Securities Commission.
Washington and Delaware have similar laws, passed in 2010 and 2014,
respectively, that allow ﬁnancial advisors to pause a transaction if they
suspect ﬁnancial exploitation. This provides a short window to investigate
the allegations before the client’s money vanishes.
With support from their trade organizations, investment advisory ﬁrms
from around the country encouraged NASAA and FINRA to follow these
pioneering states and draft similar legislation. Both organizations issued
proposals that give advisors safe harbor protections for intervening in
cases of fraud and ﬁnancial abuse, but there are important differences
between the proposals. NASAA’s Model Act permits ﬁrms to reach out to
others if exploitation is suspected, but only if the client (age 60+) previously
named emergency contacts. It does not provide legal protection if author-
ization was not provided in advance. As a Model Act, NASAA’s 2015 proposal
will need to be enacted by individual states before it becomes law.
FINRA’s rule proposals (amendments to rules 4512 and 2165) require
that ﬁrmsmake reasonable efforts to proactively obtain contact information for
a trusted person when an account is opened or in the course of updating
account information, yet if no trusted person is listed on the account, ﬁrms
would be permitted to breach privacy rules and contact an immediate family
member of their choosing (FINRA 2015b). NASAA’s proposal permits
member ﬁrms to place a hold on the disbursement of funds or securities
for up to ten days if they suspect exploitation or have concerns about
diminished ﬁnancial capacity, whereas FINRA’s proposal allows a ﬁfteen-
day hold but only in response to suspected fraud or exploitation. Once the
hold is in place, ﬁrms must immediately review the facts and circumstances
that caused them to believe that exploitation is occurring, has been
attempted, or will be attempted. NASAA’s proposal mandates that all ﬁrms
report to APS, but FINRA’s proposal leaves APS reporting requirements up
to the states. Because state securities regulators oversee more designations
of ﬁnancial planners than FINRA, which only has jurisdiction over its
member broker-dealers, adoption of NASAA’s proposal may have greater
impact across the industry. The regulators we interviewed stated that they do
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not anticipate signiﬁcant pushback from ﬁrms as they offer more ﬂexibility
and safe harbor protection.
Regulation S-ID: Preventing Identity Theft
In April 2013, CFTC and SEC issued a joint rule, Regulation S-ID under the
Dodd–Frank Act, designed to protect consumers from identity theft. This
rule also protects individuals from fraud and ﬁnancial abuse because it
requires broker-dealers, investment companies, and investment advisors to
establish and maintain programs for verifying investor identities and detect-
ing the red ﬂags of identity theft. Many of these signs overlap with ﬁnancial
exploitation. The rule requires that ﬁrms monitor accounts for fraudulent
activity, respond when altered or forged documents are presented to advi-
sors, and determine the validity of address change requests. Firms must also
have procedures for contacting the customer and/or law enforcement to
report identity theft, and escalation procedures to refer cases to investiga-
tors. Institutions must train staff in implementing identity theft procedures
and conduct ongoing assessments of program effectiveness. Firms are per-
mitted to close existing accounts and can refuse to open new accounts if
identity theft is suspected. Thus Regulation S-ID makes it harder for scam
artists and opportunistic family members to gain access to an older client’s
accounts and to make unauthorized withdrawals.
Regulation E: Protecting Electronic Fund Transfers
Most cases of fraud and identity theft are perpetrated through electronic
channels using an access device, such as when a caregiver steals an elder’s
debit card and pin number to withdraw funds from an ATM. The Electronic
Fund Transfer Act, or Regulation E (12 CFR 205), protects consumers from
losses associated with unauthorized ATM withdrawals, point-of-sale terminal
transactions in stores, and preauthorized transfers to or from an account
such as direct deposit of Social Security payments or automatic bill pay (US
Government Publishing Ofﬁce 1978a). When a fraudulent transaction
occurs, losses to the account holder are limited to $50 as long as the customer
informs his bank within two business days after learning of the loss. Customer
liability increases to up to $500 (or up to the value of the stolen funds) after
those two days. If the customer fails to notify the bank of the unauthorized
charges after sixty days, the institution is no longer responsible for covering
any portion of the loss and the customer is fully liable. Regulation E only
protects consumers if the transaction is unauthorized. If an elder willingly
gives his debit card and pin number to his caregiver to buy him groceries,
and the caregiver drains his bank account, Regulation E may not apply.
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Regulation E also does not cover transfers of securities purchased or sold
through broker-dealers, wire transfers between ﬁnancial institutions, or
counterfeit checks, meaning that other mechanisms through which fraud
and ﬁnancial exploitation are perpetrated are not covered under the law.
Furthermore, older customers with cognitive impairments may be unaware
they have been victimized and may fail to report losses to their banks within
the sixty-day period. These vulnerable consumers face the risk of losing their
entire savings to fraud committed electronically.
Present Challenges
To improve the industry’s response to elder ﬁnancial victimization, a num-
ber of problems still need to be addressed. One wealth advisory ﬁrm stated
that the three barriers to improving detection and response to ﬁnancial
exploitation are: (1) the high cost of implementing changes to policies and
procedures, (2) restrictive legislation, and (3) insufﬁcient personnel. The
securities regulators we interviewed expressed concern that ﬁrms were not
doing enough to protect their clients, but that allowing them to delay
transactions and break privacy rules would give the ﬁnancial industry too
much control. They stated that ﬁnancial victimization is hard to diagnose
with absolute certainty. Without clear guidelines that specify exactly when
ﬁnancial ﬁrms are authorized to intercede, ﬁrms might lean in the direction
of overprotection and interfere with their clients’ liberty to make independ-
ent ﬁnancial choices. They may also unintentionally disclose information to
a perpetrator who is named as the client’s emergency contact. Interview
respondents recommended more rules and guidance to help ﬁrms decide
what to do when faced with ambiguous situations.
We also found that there is considerable variability in how ﬁrms respond
to elder ﬁnancial exploitation, even within the same company. Although
banks must adhere to many of the same reporting and privacy rules as
broker-dealers, their protection practices vary. This lack of consistency is
largely due to differences in the regulatory bodies that oversee these two
ﬁnancial service industry sectors and their different customer relationship
models. Both companies would be better equipped to combat ﬁnancial
exploitation if they shared resources across departments and institutions.
This would also help save on program development costs.
There are considerable barriers to resolving cases of elder ﬁnancial
victimization. According to our interview with a ﬁnancial fraud detective,
the policy of internally escalating cases of suspected ﬁnancial exploitation to
compliance ofﬁcers is ill-advised. Law enforcement needs to be immediately
informed of potential criminal activity to apprehend perpetrators, and APS
workers also need to be notiﬁed to ensure client safety. When ﬁrms are slow
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to report, perpetrators have more time to spend older people’s money and
to cover their tracks.
Another challenge for detectives is obtaining client ﬁnancial records to
support criminal investigations, even in cases where ﬁrms do report directly
to police. In 2007, FinCEN issued guidance on the legality of disclosing
private ﬁnancial information to investigatory agencies (FinCEN 2007). This
guidance stated that, when an institution ﬁles an SAR, it must retain and
provide all documentation supporting the SAR to law enforcement and/or
to appropriate supervisory agencies upon request. This disclosure is pro-
tected by safe harbor provisions and no legal process is needed, yet some
ﬁrms still require law enforcement to fax them a warrant from a judge
before releasing information. Others require the warrant to be delivered
in person. These procedural inconsistencies across ﬁrms create additional
barriers to law enforcement ofﬁcers who have minimal training in investi-
gating complex ﬁnancial crimes. As a result, perpetrators are rarely pros-
ecuted for elder ﬁnancial abuse (Navarro et al. 2013).
Representatives at the ﬁrms we interviewed agreed that collaborative
partnerships with local law enforcement and APS agencies are needed.
They suggested that law enforcement provide ﬁrms with regular updates
on the progress of investigations and the outcomes of the case, yet detectives
and APS workers are not legally permitted to share information about an
open case. Premature disclosure could potentially compromise their inves-
tigations (Swett and Millstein 2002). This lack of communication between
ﬁnancial ﬁrms and local investigators may protect the privacy of those
involved, but it also creates a disincentive to report as some private sector
employees feel their concerns are ignored.
One solution to this fragmentation in communication is encouraging
representatives at each ﬁrm to participate in local multidisciplinary teams
that help coordinate inter-agency response to ﬁnancial exploitation.
Examples include Elder Abuse Forensic Centers and Fiduciary Abuse Spe-
cialist Teams. Member agencies generally include local law enforcement,
APS, district attorneys, victim advocates, social services, legal services, and
physical and mental health providers. These partnerships seek to ensure
client safety, collect comprehensive and accurate information useful for
legal proceedings (e.g., prosecutions and/or guardianship/conservator-
ship), and secure client property and assets (Navarro et al. 2015). Though
conﬁdentiality provisions differ across states, most laws permit team mem-
bers to share information with each other without violating privacy rules.
Research shows that collaboration among stakeholders increases the odds
of criminal prosecution of offenders and conservatorship of vulnerable adults
who are victims ofﬁnancial crimes (Navarro et al. 2013; Gassoumis et al. 2015).
Elder abuse multidisciplinary teams could beneﬁt from participation by
ﬁnancial service professionals with expertise in forensic accounting. Bridges
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between the ﬁnancial service industry, the adult protection system, and the
criminal justice system could also help ﬁnancial ﬁrms. They beneﬁt from
greater community involvement, networking opportunities, and an improved
understanding of investigation procedures.
Future Steps
Proactive strategies preventing elder ﬁnancial exploitation and fraud can be
a powerful business differentiator in a crowded ﬁnancial services market-
place. Large ﬁrms have the resources to invest in training and consumer
education programs to combat ﬁnancial victimization, yet they also have less
ﬂexible response protocols. Community banks are more nimble and can
adapt their protocols based on what services they provide, the regions they
operate in, and the age of their clients, yet they also have smaller budgets to
invest in such initiatives.
Trade organizations are supporting member ﬁrms by developing training
resources and consumer education materials. SIFMA created an online Senior
Investor Protection Resource Center where member ﬁrms can download free
resources. Trade organizations have established partnerships with adult pro-
tection agencies, senior advocacy groups, and other professionals that work
with vulnerable adults. For example, NASAA partnered with the National
Adult Protective Services Association and physician groups to increase aware-
ness. Moreover, aging and consumer advocacy groups can put pressure on
policymakers to improve and clarify laws so that banks and wealth advisory
ﬁrms are operating under the same guidelines. As part of its BankSafe initia-
tive, the AARP Public Policy Institute conducted a survey and found that over
80 percent of adults age 50+ prefer to establish accounts at banks that offer
services to protect them against ﬁnancial victimization, such as extra account
monitoring, phone calls to warn about suspicious activity, and having highly
trained bank staff (Gunther 2016). Therefore, consumers can also motivate
the industry by patronizing ﬁrms that offer more age-friendly services and that
demonstrate a commitment to protecting them as they age.
There is tremendous opportunity for the ﬁnancial service industry to
engage with researchers to better understand elder ﬁnancial exploitation,
particularly inmapping patterns in customers’ spending and saving behavior
to proactively identify those most at risk, the mechanisms through which
money changes hands, and possible touch points for educating customers on
avoiding fraud and ﬁnancial abuse. To our knowledge, there have been no
studies evaluating the efﬁcacy of different training programs to determine
whether they increase identiﬁcation and reporting of ﬁnancial victimization.
There is also scarce data on the total value of assets that have been protected
or recovered using different prevention strategies, and whether customers
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are satisﬁed with their ﬁrm’s response. Companies should turn to research
before investing time and money on potentially ineffective programs.
Research in behavioral economics and decision neuroscience could also
inform the industry about how age-related changes in decision making
increase the risk of fraud and exploitation. Most decision research is con-
ducted in laboratory settings where participants receive hypothetical endow-
ments of funds and are instructed to make purchase decisions among a
ﬁxed set of options. Findings do not necessarily generalize to applied
situations in which consumers are spending and investing their own
money. This represents an enormous gap in the literature and highlights a
need to develop protocols for how researchers can work with the private
sector’s data and clients without violating privacy laws or jeopardizing data
security.
Conclusions
US ﬁnancial services are changing rapidly with advances in technology. The
personal relationships that ﬁnancial ﬁrms have with their clients and cus-
tomers will become less common as Millennials replace Baby Boomers as the
primary users of ﬁnancial services. New technologies are shaping how often
and in what capacity customers interact with bank staff and ﬁnancial advi-
sors. While 89 percent of Americans age 50+ visit their bank in person
(Gunther 2016), younger customers mainly rely on online banking to
make transactions and view account balances (TD Bank 2014). Other new
services includemobile apps for instantly transferring funds person-to-person,
credit card readers that plug into cellular phones, and ‘robo-advisors’ that
virtually select and manage investment portfolios without guidance from a
personal ﬁnancial advisor.
New access devices and increased automation will not stop fraud and
ﬁnancial abuse. These services may perhaps make the problem worse. As
younger generations grow older, how will emerging technologies detect
diminished ﬁnancial capacity, undue inﬂuence, and other subtle signs of
exploitation? While the ﬁnancial industry is mobilizing to protect older
clients today, it must also look ahead and invest in solutions that protect
future ﬁnancial services customers.
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Notes
1. Fraud prevention efforts by credit card companies, credit unions, insurance
providers, money transfer businesses, and venture capital ﬁrms are not discussed
in this chapter.
2. Interviews took place between September and November in 2015 and were
conducted by telephone. Potential participants were identiﬁed through their
sponsorship and collaborative relationships with researchers at the Stanford
Center on Longevity (SCL) and SCL’s Corporate Afﬁliates Program and Advisory
Board. Interviews were arranged by the primary contact person at the institution
or agency who assisted by selecting knowledgeable members who could discuss
their company’s ﬁnancial exploitation detection and prevention programs and/
or who were familiar with regulatory policies governing the issue.
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